A Review of Jesus and the Father: Modern Evangelicals Reinvent the Doctrine of the Trinity by Kevin Giles

Introduction

In Jesus and the Father: Modern Evangelicals Reinvent the Doctrine of the Trinity, Kevin Giles makes some bold accusations. This is his second book dealing with issues of subordination and ordering in the Godhead, and this book expands on the arguments he advanced in his first, The Trinity and Subordinationism: The Doctrine of God and the Contemporary Gender Debate (InterVarsity Press, 2002). In the most recent volume, Giles goes further than ever before, accusing a wide swath of evangelicals of being heretics along the lines of the notorious fourth century Alexandrian presbyter, Arius, and of being tritheists as well. Audacious claims, to be sure, but does Giles make his case? The present review intends to explore and answer that question.

Until his recent retirement Giles was the vicar of St. Michael's Church, an Anglican congregation in North Carlton, Australia. His writing has primarily focused on the issue of women's roles in the church. In The Trinity and Subordinationism he specifically charged that complementarians were using a faulty understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity to substantiate and undergird their views on male-female role relationships in the home and the church. He also contributed a chapter on the same subject to Discovering Biblical Equality (InterVarsity Press, 2004). Jesus and the Father is an expansion of parts of those works; specifically, Giles's desire is to examine the issue of subordination in regard to the doctrine of the Trinity. His arguments have not changed substantially from the earlier works. He claims that his even more intense study of the doctrine in the intervening years have reinforced his view of an egalitarian Trinity.

This review will proceed by, first, examining Giles's thesis and his stated intentions in Jesus and the Father; second, by providing a brief overview of the book's contents; and third, by providing an evaluation of the book in regard to philosophical and theological strengths and weaknesses.

Contents

Thesis and Purpose

The book may best be seen as a polemic against those who assert that, within the bounds of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, there exists room for the view that there is an asymmetry of relationships among the members of the Godhead, and the Father has relational primacy such that the Son and the Spirit, while remaining in their very nature God, eternally submit to the Father. In contrast, Giles claims that there is no place for subordination in any kind or in any way among the Trinity in eternity. He writes, "One of the basic arguments of this book is that to speak of the eternal subordination of the Son in function and authority by necessity implies ontological subordinationism" (30, emphasis original).

With that as his thesis, Giles's purpose is to demonstrate how a proper interpretation of Scripture and the giants of orthodox historical theology, particularly Athanasius, the Cappadocians, Augustine, Calvin, Barth, and the Nicene and Athanasian creeds, bolster an egalitarian understanding of the Godhead and see any hint of subordination as heretical. By extension he desires to show that those who assert the eternal functional subordination of the Son have strayed from orthodoxy and are, in fact, Arian heretics. Among those he places in this camp are, most explicitly, Wayne Grudem and the Sydney Anglican Doctrine Commission, but also George Knight, John Frame, Robert Letham, and Bruce Ware.¹ Giles explicitly states that his desire is not to offer a thorough treatment of the doctrine, but instead to focus on what he considers a foundational issue. It should be noted that his stated intention is to treat this question in complete separation from the issue of male-female role relationships.

Evangelicals and Trinitarian Doctrine

Giles opens the book with an introductory chapter on the current form of the debate on the doctrine of the Trinity, asserting that it was only in response to women taking a more pronounced role in leadership in church and home that some defensive evangelicals began positing the eternal subordination of the Son to the Father in role or function. Such a view, he argues, did not exist prior to the mid-1970s. This hypothesis leads him to the conclusion that those who take this view are reading their views on gender roles back into the doctrine of God, a case of the tail wagging the dog. The idea that the Son is, in view of his very nature, totally equal with God but also submits to the Father in his relationship as the eternal Son is paradoxical and confusing to Giles. He regards this understanding of the Trinity as a veiled attempt "to reinstate a form of social ordering modern culture has largely repudiated" (31).

To Giles "eternal" is the same as "ontological."²  He charges that many complementarians, in defending this aberrant understanding of the Trinity, have intentionally and with malice misused words like role, order, and difference. He also explicitly equates two pairs of words with such force that it affects his conclusions throughout the book. To Giles, "subordinate" is the same as "inferior." This continues the affirmation that has been at the heart of egalitarian doctrine from the beginning of the debate—that to be subordinate in any way is to be inferior to or less than. The second pair of important synonyms is "authority" and "power" or "omnipotence." More on that later.

Giles concludes his introductory chapters with biographical notes on the "major players" in the debate, namely, the historical theologians with which he will interact. His final note in this section is to say that he is reading the Bible and sources as they are meant to be read, and not with presuppositional bias like his opponents.

In his chapter on biblical teaching on the Trinity, Giles sketches a three-stage Christology, which he says clearly leads to the view that the Son was subordinated to the Father only in the second stage, in his time on earth. He can say this because he is reading the Bible as the best historical theologians have—that is, when the Scriptures refer to the Son's obedience or submission, it is speaking of his earthly ministry; but when it speaks of his glory, it is speaking of him eternally.

In the book's longest chapters, Giles reiterates the arguments he made in The Trinity and Subordinationism that Athanasius, the Cappadocians, Augustine, and Calvin, among others, all claim that functional subordination of the Son is heresy. Perhaps one of his biggest challenges is dealing with the widely held belief that Athanasius and the Cappadocians in particular, and Augustine, held to the monarche of the Father, a position that would be problematic for his view. He seems to say that Athanasius and the Cappadocians believed the whole Godhead was the monarche, and describes Augustine as "not altogether logically consistent or clear" on the matter (156).

Giles expands on his assertion earlier in the book that authority and power are interchangeable. His argument is that to say the Son eternally submits to the Father is to deny his authority, and thus to deny his power, and thus to deny his equality with the Father. It is important to note that here he does not quote the church fathers at length in defense of this logical assertion. Rather, he assumes the legitimacy of the assertion and then quotes the church fathers in defense of the idea that denying the authority and power of the Son is heretical. This is an idea, of course, with which any evangelical theologian would agree.

In his next chapters Giles asserts that the persons of the Trinity are only to be differentiated by their relations to one another, and to differentiate them in any other ways leads toward tritheism. In chapter 7 he includes a less-than-detailed overview of the modern debate over the immanent and economic Trinity, arguing that Rahner erred in his axiom equating the two and asserting again that what is true of the Incarnation cannot be understood to be true of the Godhead in eternity. In the final chapter he notes that his opponents who claim Barth on their side in this debate do not adequately account for the dialectic nature of Barth's theology. Barth, he argues, held simultaneously that the Son is both Lord and servant; this view is totally compatible with his own, and incompatible with that of his opponents.

Evaluation

Giles rightly places the doctrine of the Trinity where it should be, in the middle of the whole of Christian theology. His strong affirmation of the centrality of Trinitarian doctrine—he writes that many Christians mistakenly believe the Trinity is a "very abstract and somewhat impractical doctrine" (12)—is clear, concise, and most welcome.

Giles is also an excellent writer. The subject of each chapter is clearly delineated, he sticks to his argument without veering into matters of little import, and he summarizes his arguments well and often. He is rarely repetitive, but often repetitious—by that I mean that he restates his arguments often enough to make them clear and discernible to the reader, but not so often that it seems monotonous. In fact, Giles's writing ability is likely what has gained him such a following among those who share his views. He is able to put forth his ideas with clarity and succinctness. Were his presuppositions and conclusions not so erroneous, this is the type of book one could hand to an educated layman who was interested in the doctrine of the Trinity.

Unfortunately, I cannot recommend this book for such a purpose. Giles fails to accomplish his goal—that is, to prove that those who hold to the eternal submission of the Son to the Father in role or function are Arian heretics. That is his central purpose, and that is the standard to which he must be held. If he succeeds in showing that the eternal functional submission of the Son is Arianism, then his book stands as a strong condemnation of those views. If he cannot succeed in that task, then he has missed the point entirely and his book is relatively worthless. I believe he has not made his case.

Distinction of Person and Nature

Giles does not make the necessary distinction between person and nature in the doctrine of the Trinity that the creeds allow. It should come as no surprise that he does not do this, because it seems that to do so would damage his central thesis that eternal subordination in role or function is the same as Arianism. In one passage that fairly represents his overall view, Giles writes, "If the divine Son is eternally subordinated in role or function, he is a subordinated divine person. His subordination as it is eternal defines his person. In other words, he is subordinated in being" (46). What makes this statement problematic is how the last sentence stands in relation to the first two. In Giles's mind, to be subordinate as a person eternally is to be subordinate in nature as well. Restating Giles's argument in Trinitarian terms, the eternal subordination of the Son in his Sonness is the same as the eternal subordination of the Son in his Godness. But this is not necessarily so, at least not according to classical formulation of Christian doctrine.

Those who hold to the eternal subordination of the Son in function or role would argue, along the lines of historic trinitarian orthodoxy, that the Son's role or function is particular to his person as the Son, not to his nature as God. These distinctions are allowed, even encouraged, by all of the creeds Giles mentions in his book. It is also important to note that both person and nature are eternal categories, a fact that is demanded by the creeds. No one, though, is arguing that the Son is subordinate in his nature as God, and Giles's insistence that such a corollary is logically demanded by the complementarian position is invalid. Complementarians claim that the subordinate role or relationship of the Son is particular to his person as the Son, and his Sonness is just as eternal and necessary as his Godness. Bruce Ware puts it well:

Every essential attribute of God's nature is possessed by the Father, Son, and Spirit equally and fully. We cannot look at aspects of the nature of God as that which distinguishes the Father from the Son or Spirit; rather we have to look at the roles and relationships that characterize the Father uniquely in relation to the Son and the Spirit.³

The claim that the eternal subordination of person is the same as eternal subordination of being is untrue. The disagreement at hand over the nature of Christ's subordination, important as it is, seems to be a debate that can take place within the bounds of the creeds because of the way they distinguish between person and nature. Giles's insistence that this is a matter of heresy versus orthodoxy overstates the case. Unfortunately, the contents of Jesus and the Father are based on the bald assertion that complementarians are Arian heretics because of the position they hold.

The preceding point leads one to doubt seriously whether all of the patristic and Reformation evidence that Giles has supposedly amassed in his favor in Jesus and the Father is as cut-and-dry as he makes it out to be. Because his arguments from Athanasius, the Cappadocians, Calvin, and others have not substantially changed from his earlier works, it is not necessary for me to delve into great detail criticizing his arguments when others have done so rather skillfully.⁴  My point is simply this: Patristic scholars, particularly those writing around the time of Nicea and Constantinople, were not primarily having a discussion about whether or not the functional subordination of the Son, particular to his person, was eternal or limited to the incarnation. They were having a discussion about whether or not the Son is subordinate to the Father in nature as God. As I have tried to demonstrate, the former of these discussions can be had within the bounds of orthodoxy. The second cannot. It is at least questionable whether the content of great theologians engaged in the latter debate—Athanasius, the Cappadocians, etc.—can be lifted wholesale and advanced as authoritatively in the former debate, as Giles does. This is not to say that the great theologians have nothing to say to those of us engaged in this debate; rather, one should be rather more circumspect and careful when handling such texts, in contrast to the relative carelessness displayed in Jesus and the Father.

Giles makes a similar mistake in regard to the discussion of power and authority, which he has equated with "omnipotence." The Son's omnipotence is best seen theologically to belong to his nature as God, and thus as the Son he possesses the same omnipotence as the Father or the Spirit. A separation cannot be drawn. All of that does not preclude the fact that as the second person of the Godhead the Son can exercise his power under the submission of his Father and still remain omnipotent. It is because Giles misunderstands this point that he writes, "the assertion that the Father rules over the Son indicates that it is believed that the Father has greater authority and power than the Son. He reigns over all, including the Son, as a monarch" (202). Giles has again misrepresented the complementarian view and as a result his analysis is off-base.⁵

Mischaracterization of His Opponents

Giles's caricature of his opponents' mindset is disingenuous, at places absurdly so. One example will suffice. Early in the first chapter, under the heading "How Could Evangelicals Get Their Doctrine of the Trinity So Wrong?", Giles seems to be speaking to the uninformed in this debate when he asks rhetorically about his opponents, "How is it that so many evangelicals believe what is patently counter to the Christian faith as it has been defined in the past?" (32). Putting aside the fact that he has assumed the veracity of his thesis for the purpose of argumentation without bothering to prove it, Giles's "answer" to his own question is sheer arrogance.

First, he claims that evangelical scholars' weakness in historical doctrine has led them to miss completely this obvious "[Arianism] in a new form" (32). Second, he lays the blame at the feet of wrong-headed theologians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, even though later in the book the only actual enemy engaged in any real depth is Charles Hodge. Third, everyone—except, it seems, egalitarians who knew better—assumed that Grudem, Ware, the Sydney Doctrine Commission, et al, were good theologians who were always right, so no one bothered to check up on them.

While it may be stylish to accuse one's opponents of historical ignorance, in this case it is a gross overgeneralization that is unsubstantiated in its facts. In the ensuing explanation of his three answers to his rhetorical question, Giles does not put forward one piece of credible evidence to show that the particular theologians whom he is attacking had a deficient knowledge of historical theology such that they were unaware that they were touting Arianism. Neither does he prove that other theologians or pastors who have applauded their work—say, many members of The Council on Biblical Manhood and Womanhood—are so ignorant. Never does Giles prove a substantial causal link between a supposed lack of knowledge among evangelicals and the doctrine of the eternal submission of the Son to the Father in role. It is simply asserted.

Misunderstanding of Arianism

Giles understates the nature of the Arian heresy. Giles believes that the most fundamental characteristic of an Arian is one who subordinates the Son in role, authority, and being. He writes, "[Arianism] is a very broad category covering people and theological groupings with differing views on many things, united only by their common conviction that the Son is eternally subordinated to the Father in being, work/function, and authority" (9, n.1). This statement betrays a stilted view of Arianism that is rhetorically designed to advance his book's argument, rather than designed to be most true to historical theology. The most fundamental characteristic of the Arian heresy, the one that the Nicene Creed was crafted to dismiss, is the notion that the Son is a creature and therefore unlike the Divine Father in substantial ways.

Gregg and Groh—who, Giles claims, support his argument in their book Early Arianism—write, "The central Arian model was that of a perfected creature whose nature remained always creaturely and whose position was always subordinate to and dependent upon the Father's will (italics mine)."⁶  Each first year seminary student learns the Arian mantra, "There was when he was not," referring to the Son's createdness. The total subordination of the Son was a necessary corollary of this view, to be sure, but it was not the starting point. To boil Arianism down to make subordination as such its central tenet is misleading. No one in this debate is saying that the Son is a creature, and no one is arguing for the eternal functional submission of the Son on that basis. Thus, there is a great difference between classical Arian arguments for the subordination of the Son and contemporary arguments for the submission of the Son.

In pressing this point further, Giles launches an ad hominem attack on many evangelicals, making them guilty by association. His argument goes: The Arians believed in the eternal functional subordination of the Son. There are modern evangelicals, like Grudem, Ware, et al., who believe in the eternal functional subordination of the Son. Therefore, Grudem, Ware, and company are Arians. For example, he writes,

That Arius ontologically subordinated the Son to the Father is well known. What is less well known and adequately recognized is that he and all the Arians also subordinated the Son in authority. Richard Hanson in his monumental study of Arianism says the Arians consistently taught that the Son "does the Father's will and exhibits obedience and subordination to the Father, and adores and praises the Father, not only in his earthly ministry but also in Heaven" (italics in original) (178).

This statement is misleading on several levels. First, how is it "less well known" that the Arians subordinated the Son in authority? This information is in fact widely known because it follows from the Arian teaching on the Son's creaturely status. Second and most important, when read in context, by italicizing phrases in Hanson's work, Giles means to imply a causal connection between the Arian teaching and modern evangelical complementarianism. The logic is false, and again his charge of Arianism does not stick.

Differentiating the Divine Persons

The question must be asked, how does Giles actually differentiate the divine persons? His argument is that their differences are relative; that is, the Father is not the Son, the Son is not the Spirit, the Spirit is not the Father, and so on. On the other hand, he argues vociferously elsewhere that the terms Father and Son are metaphorical, and do not describe God in his essence. If these relational terms do not actually describe God in his essence, then how can they be the basis for eternal differentiation?

Letham has pointed out that Giles's view of the Trinity has "troubling modalist tendencies."⁷  In fact, when read out of context and stretched to their extreme conclusions, Giles's views could be considered modalistic, as he grounds distinctions only in the fact that one divine Person is not the other without adequately discussing any distinction in role or function. But this in and of itself does not make Giles a modalist. So it is with the complementarian view. Could one push the view of Grudem, Ware, and the Sydney Doctrinal Commission to its extreme and end up with subordinationism and tritheism? It is possible, but that is not what these theologians have done. They have attempted to formulate their understanding of Trinitarian doctrine within the realm of historic orthodoxy and have repeatedly affirmed their belief in the equality of nature of the Father, Son and Spirit. Giles does not recognize or appreciate the important point that almost any view can be stretched or distorted to resemble heresy—that does not mean it should be.

As an aside, Giles emphatically accuses his opponents of forming their Trinitarian theology on the basis of their anthropology, specifically the issue of gender roles. He fails to mention that, based on his publication record, he seems to have come to his in-depth study with already-formed opinions on gender roles. One can only conclude that he must feel himself impenetrable to such bias.⁸

Conclusion

Perhaps the most unnerving weakness of Giles's book is not in its argumentation, but rather in its harshness toward fellow believers with whom he disagrees. Giles asserts that he has been personally attacked by many on the complementarian side of this at-times rancorous debate over gender roles, and that is a shame. But that is hardly an excuse for the polemical and ad hominem attacks that typify Jesus and the Father. He calls his book in one place a "plea from the heart" (9), but that hardly jives with the numerous times he charges that his opponents must be stupid, lazy, or deceitful for not sharing his views.

To equate one's debating opponents with the most notorious heresy in Christian history while lacking clear and irrefutable evidence does not befit a discussion amongst the children of God. Unfortunately, this book brings the debate between complementarians and egalitarians to an all-time low, and cannot be recommended.